‘Heart of Darkness’

Current images of the DRC and their theoretical underpinning

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**Abstract**

This article provides a critical overview of dominant images of Africa in general and of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in particular, in Western media as well as some scholarly literature. I then go on to show that these images are products of a very specific conception of the state and sovereignty. The study is primarily concerned with the nature of the African postcolonial state: is it failed or not? Is it absent or not? What role has it afforded new ethnic networks? Scholars of the state in Africa argue that it is ‘weak’ or has ‘failed’. When they do so they are drawing on the evidence of a real crisis prevalent in state structures in Africa today – however, as the study shows, they conflate the absence of government with the absence of governance. I argue that the state has not disappeared, but many of its traditional roles such as the provision of education, infrastructure, and security have been taken over by subordinate groups, mostly mobilized along ethnic lines.

**Key Words**

African postcolonial states • Catholic Church • Democratic Republic of the Congo • Nande • non-state sovereignties • post-national model • post-state governance • statist fantasies

**INTRODUCTION**

When asked why, given the fragmented nature of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s political sphere, the United Nations Mission in the DRC – known by its French acronym MONUC – instead of general national elections could not have started with local, village and community elections, the answer is very symptomatic. In the DRC, we are in the presence of a ‘failed’ state, or more precisely a ‘collapsed’ state. What needs to be done is to fix it or to ‘restore’ a functional state. In fact a curious consequence of the UN view on ‘state collapse’ is that the academic analysis on which it relies is directed primarily at possibilities for post-collapse intervention. ‘Putting Humpty Dumpty back together’ rather than paying attention to the evolution of social practices on the ground remains the policy of MONUC in the DRC.
For William Zartman (1995) the first precondition of successful analysis is a reaffirmation of the existing political unit: ‘The restoration of the state remains dependent on the reaffirmation of the pre-collapse state’ (1995: 268). The United Nations Mission in the Congo came to the DRC with the theoretical assumption of ‘fixing a failed state’ (Ghani and Lockhart, 2008). But the question is which state does it want to rebuild, restore or fix? To grapple with this question, it is important to understand the nature of African postcolonial states.

POSTCOLONIAL AFRICAN STATES

There are two broad ways that scholars of African studies have predominantly understood the transformation of the state after decolonization. On the one hand are those who insist on ‘the criminalization of the state’ (Bayart et al., 1999; Roitman, 2005; Mbembe, 2000; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Mamdani, 1996; Reno, 2006; Masquelier, 2000). And, on the other hand, are those who consider the African postcolonial state as a continuity of a precolonial savage anarchy (Clapham, 1996; Kaplan, 1994). Indeed, there are prominent ‘scholars in African studies’, such as Ferguson (1992) or Camoroff (2000), who have other perspectives as well.

Jean François Bayart traced the origins of the contemporary African state to the beginning of the colonial era. For Bayart, ‘the vicissitudes of the conquest and the modalities of colonial economic exploitation make up the genesis of the contemporary state’ (1989: 14). In contemporary Cameroon, for instance, national politics are characterized by a pattern of consumption that Bayart (1989) called ‘the politics of the belly’ to account for the rapaciousness, the perversity, and the violence of the state and its cronies. Bayart also characterized African elite predatory behavior in the following way:

The dominant groups who hold power in black Africa continue to live chiefly off the income they derive from their positions as intermediaries vis-à-vis the international system. The principal source of accumulation for the dominant actors, the country, lies in the more or less legal trade and the embezzlement of international aid. (Bayart, 1989: 25)

This position is not wrong per se but, as we will see, it does not question the state as it has been imposed in Africa in the first place. What Bayart criticizes accurately is the behavior of African state leaders, but not the state itself as an inadequate social organization for Africa.

In their Criminalization of the State in Africa, Bayart, Ellis and Hibou contend that politics in Africa has become markedly interconnected with crime (1999: 14). In Africa, according to Bayart et al., the interaction between the practices of power, war, economic accumulation and illicit activities of various types form a particular political trajectory. Illegitimate use of violence now takes place on a massive scale, including at the behest of those who hold formal political and public office as they undertake wars or struggle to restore authoritarian regimes (1999: 16). Thus, the criminalization of politics in African states is regarded as routine. At the heart of political and government institutions and circuits are practices whose criminal nature is patent, whether as defined by the law of the country in question or as defined by international organizations. They write:
The process of criminalization has become the dominant trait of Africa in which the state has literally imploded under the combined effects of economic crisis, the neoliberal program of structural adjustment and the loss of legitimacy of political institutions. It is further eroded by the emigration of the best-trained people and by privatization schemes, which concern not just the public sector of the economy, but also the national sovereignty, such as the customs services and the organs of public security and national defense. (Bayart et al., 1999: 20)

They conclude that, in Africa, the capacity of the state to execute any form of policy has simply evaporated and churches or religious solidarities have taken its place. For these authors, the problem of Africa today is the uncertainty of its insertion in the international order combined with sluggishness in the present phase of democratic transition. Indeed, one of the consequences of this particular conjuncture of factors is an erosion of the very foundations of political regimes, which are becoming markedly connected to crime (Bayart et al., 1999: 14). They contend that the state is not absent; on the contrary, it is present as organized criminals.1

Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz (1999) think that political actors in Africa seek to maximize their returns on the state of confusion, uncertainty and sometimes even chaos which characterizes most African polities. This political instrumentalization of disorder is the way African elites expand their grip on power in a shadow state. Finally, William Reno explains the creation of the shadow state:2

The fact of underdevelopment, combined with the way in which globalization, aid dependence and structural adjustment have undermined the institutions and legitimacy of African states, creates a particularly acute and virulent form of crisis of the state which in turn creates the conditions in which collapse becomes a real, albeit inevitable, possibility. In such circumstances it makes more sense for local elites to eschew long-term and inclusive state-building in favor of strategies designed to exploit their control over local resources and links to both formal and informal global economy in order to extract wealth and generate political support via the distribution of rewards to key supporters. (Reno in Cooper, 2002: 184)

As far as the debate on the state is concerned, Reno’s shadow state remains within the same paradigm of the fetishization of the state that distinguishes the framework as defined by Weber and others. As we will see later, the ‘shadow’ in question is a shadowy replication of the rationalized Weberian state that is presumed to have ‘failed’. In all of this, the givenness and supposed naturalness of ‘the state’ remain uncritically and categorically fixed, even when the tortured logic of state ‘failure’ or ‘collapse’ is deployed to signal the presumed disappearance of that ‘thing’ (the state) which is left unquestioned.

The consensus among the authors studying African postcolonial states (Mamdani, Mbembe, Bayart, Hibou, Ellis, Roitman or Reno) is built around the notion that postcolonial African leaders inherited a predatory state and they followed the same path as their colonial predecessors. Yes indeed, Reno and others are right when they identify everything that undermines the institutions and the legitimacy of African states, and creates the conditions for the emergence of various kinds of local control of resources. However, this study argues that the state is a form of social relations, and shows that the
dynamics which create and also are created by this form (‘state’) contain the possibility of going outside the fixed and reified forms they take. In other words, the very social relations and struggles that engender state formations may also take non-state forms. The state form is always contingent, and each state is a historically particular distillation of more elementary social relations and conflicts.

On the other hand, there are those who think that, politically, Africa is merely a failed story. Its leaders are ‘crazy’; economically, the continent is ‘off the map’ of the globalized economy, and socially it suffers under a continuous reign of brutality and war. Christopher Clapham (1996) sees in the new African wars a continuity of precolonial – i.e. ‘savage’ – behavior. For Clapham, wars directed against indigenous African governments grew initially out of failures in the decolonization settlements, which subjected a number of peoples and territories to states widely regarded as alien and illegitimate. Thus, the decision to resort to insurgency results from the structures or values of particular societies.

In other words, weak state structures and violence in pursuit of communal goals were common features of precolonial society. What is now defined as insurgency may be understood as a continuation of earlier effective methods. According to Clapham, insurgent armies developing in societies in which raiding or pillaging were already established aspects of warfare readily incorporate these same practices in pursuit of their new goals. Raiding and pillaging often increase in geographical range or frequency of attacks with the incorporation of Africa into the global economy. Moreover, Clapham goes on to say that few African states made provisions for reasoned opposition to incumbent authorities, and the conventional way of expressing opposition in precolonial Africa was ‘exit’ or withdrawal from the regime altogether. In postcolonial territorial states, where the opportunities for exit were reduced drastically, the incentive to resort to force was correspondingly enhanced.

Similarly, explaining the war in Sierra Leone, journalist Robert Kaplan wrote still more bluntly: ‘Africa has regressed to its inherent barbarism, which manifests itself by atrocious and senseless ethnic massacres in a context of quasi-anarchy in which warlords finance their actions through criminal activities’ (Kaplan, 1994: 71). These images of primordial savagery and tribal slaughter tend to be applied indiscriminately to most African countries. If one asks persons in Europe or North America for their perceptions of ‘Africa’, and if they do not happen to use the words ‘poverty’ or ‘catastrophe’, they will certainly mention ‘war’. Kaplan’s The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the Twenty-first Century (1998) was one of the most powerful contemporary iterations of the emergence of this construction of Africa in the 1990s. In a section of The Ends of the Earth titled ‘The Coming of Anarchy’ Kaplan, who was granted a kind of secular pulpit from which to survey the dangers and ‘threat to security’ that are now felt to loom out of the post-Cold War shadows, warned Western governments and landing agencies of an impending social collapse in sub-Saharan Africa.

To understand Kaplan’s argument, it is important to grasp what he calls the ‘tragedy’ of nations that are not and never were ‘an organic outgrowth of geography and ethnicity’ (1994: 71). Kaplan explains: ‘My goal was to see humanity in each locale as literally an outgrowth of the terrain and climate in which it was fated to live’ (1994: 7). And Africa is, for Kaplan, the ‘inescapable center’ and place to start because it may have already begun its slide into extinction, propelled by uncontrolled population growth and
new ‘luxuriating’ viruses. Besides, for Kaplan, Africa, the hottest and poorest region of the world, is ‘nature writ large’ (1994: 4). Africa, according to Kaplan, suffers from a deficient social ingenuity which is the root cause of its accelerating surrender to a Malthusian nature. ‘What good are new Western vaccines in an anarchic African country where health clinics are constantly being vandalized or having their electricity cut?’ asks Kaplan.

To get to the heart of Kaplan’s position it is important to clarify what distinguishes his views from the racist eurocentrism of people such as Conrad. For Conrad, African ‘inferiority’, however deep-seated it was presupposed to be, still appealed to the white European’s responsibility to undertake a paternal act of ‘civilization’ through direct colonization (Larsen, 1997: 7). Conrad saw a natural-historical imbalance, which it was the European’s providential destiny to correct by the ‘mission civilisatrice’. But, for Kaplan, this ‘mission civilisatrice’ effort was ‘naturally’ doomed from the start because of an environmentally determined ‘anarchy’ that nothing – neither the national liberation movements themselves, nor even European colonizers whom they overcame and expelled – can or could have staved off.

Kaplan sees no agency in Africans who, according to him, are naturally driven. Kaplan cannot concede even that minimal degree of historical agency entailed in making war. After touring west African countries, including Liberia and Sierra Leone, he proclaimed, ‘the forest had made the war’. Nature, in its re-absorption of the short-lived African nation-state, its collapsing of the nation’s mythic underpinning, is left as the only historical player capable of action in Kaplan’s meta-narrative. However, nature, for Kaplan, the nature that ‘made the war in Liberia and Sierra Leone’, is the nature of Hobbes, not of Montesquieu or Locke, much less of Rousseau (nature that one can educate and transform into culture). It is not even a Darwinian nature unless the supposed ‘anarchy’ can be somehow thought of as a form of adaptation. It is the ‘natura naturata’, a fixed, determined nature, incapable of change, as Spinoza would say, to distinguish it from the ‘natura naturans’ which is nature as a sovereign power that produces beings and change.

The logic underpinning Kaplan’s dismissal and reactionary vision of postcolonial Africa is to be found in what he thinks to be the antidote to nature – namely, the full, contemporary historical reality of global capitalism. African efforts to initiate a rapid process of ‘primitive accumulation’ of capital could not but ultimately come to grief, since ‘the level attained by the enormous stocks of capital in the West, a level presupposed if any further growth is to result, is no longer attainable – within the existing commodity logic in other regions of the world’ (Larsen, 1997: 198–9). ‘Such constant increases in productivity, increases that exceed the bounds of comprehension of commodity production, can only inhibit any recuperative processes of primitive accumulation’ (Larsen, 1997: 221). Finally, ripped from their traditional village or tribal social-economies and herded into the new, gargantuan urban slums of the Third World – where they have become the new global proletariat – an enormous mass of Africans find themselves in the limbo of ‘monetary subjects, but without money’ (Larsen, 1997: 223).

The immediate result is the collapse of political and economic institutions that had arisen in the course of now abandoned strategies of capitalist modernization. This leads to civil and ethnic wars and their accompanying ideologies of religious and tribal
fundamentalisms and virulent neo- and sub-nationalisms. This is what Kaplan learned from what he depicted as his street level travels through Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire and Egypt. For him, this reality has been paradoxically historically and culturally generated but ‘naturally’ and ‘environmentally’ condemned to extinction. To make his point, Kaplan resorts to the dualities of a Western European ‘civilization’ versus a naturalized ‘barbarism’, leaving the nation hovering somewhere in between. The ‘End of the Third World History’ (which, if we are not careful to contain the spread of ‘anarchy’, could happen in ‘our’ backyards as well) is the final doomed return to nature.4 As Larsen puts it, Kaplan’s eco-fascist naturalism discloses itself as the exact, ideological inversion of the reality he ‘personally experiences’. It is not ‘the forest’ that makes civil war in Liberia – or Rwanda or the DRC, etc. – but human beings, whose agriculturally and village-based ‘natural’ economies having been violently and summarily uprooted and undermined, now find themselves marooned in an absolute and unremitting historical space of ‘modernity’ that seems to lead neither forwards nor backwards.

From a more anthropological perspective, there is no such thing as ‘natura naturata’ (produced, fixed, determined nature) without ‘natura naturans’ as its source of being. As we will see in the example of the Nande region of the DRC, processes of ‘primitive accumulation’ are successfully taking place in Africa. Kaplan’s mistake was to have walked on streets of Liberia and other west African countries without ever setting aside his epistemological baggage to understand from inside-out the production of political and economical order beyond the disintegration of the colonially imposed nation-states.

The logical conclusion of these analyses of postcolonial African states is their qualification as ‘failed states’. This notion has been applied to many African countries, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Indeed, if one speaks of the Congo, one inevitably conjures up a spectre of strife, dissolution, corruption, horrendous forms of ethnic factionalism and hatred, and overall horror. Joseph Conrad’s well-known characterization of it as the ‘heart of darkness’ is certainly apt here. These images of the Congo dominate the media as well as writings by social scientists who specialize in the DRC (see Young and Turner, 1985; Reno, 1990; Evans, 1995). The assumption by these authors is that the DRC is a failed state5 – a generalization which implies a failed society. Within the context of an absent or failed state, the assumption is that selfishness will reign (Locke, Hobbes, etc.); thus a failed state adversely affects all who live under its crippled aegis, and its weakness insures suffering among all except those who manage to circumvent the system. However, these circumventions are understood not only as forms of corruption but as criminal acts from which only a few will benefit (Bayart et al., 1999; Zartman, 1995).

The economy cannot be separated from this socio-political model of the state. A strong state survives because it can regulate production and trade, profit (through taxation, etc.), and thus sustain itself. An informal economy, one that works outside state and taxation structures, is particularly irritating to the state. The overall assumption is that when a state is politically and economically unstable, weak or absent, all will suffer. As the argument goes, the DRC is not only weak and unstable but also inherently violent. The implication is that all its population is suffering terribly.

African political economies have been interpreted as increasingly marginalized by the international political economy (Callagh, 2001; Castells, 2004). Studies of globalization often ignore or provide only passing coverage of Africa.6 Globalization literature is

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devoted largely to advanced capitalist countries of the global political economy. When attention is devoted to the former ‘Third World’, it concentrates on the rise and fall – and rise again – of the newly industrialized countries of Asia. Africa is ‘off the map’ (Ferguson, 2006), rarely noticed aside from the fact that less capital is invested there now than in the 1960s, poverty is increasing, its debts continue to grow and its wars never end. Liberal and progressive intellectuals and journalists may portray the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund’s activities in Africa as the ‘recolonization’ of the dark continent, but these conceptions are not nearly as deterministic and eurocentric as those guiding less sympathetic writing which often fails to advance beyond a recapitulation of dependency theory (Bayart, 1989). Bayart provides a view of African inequality in which the African ruling class has full agency. Globalization seems to be the same old story for Africa.

The post-Cold War predicament, structured by the ideology and practice of global neoliberalism and the attendant lack of alternatives to it, affects Africa profoundly. In the advanced capitalist world, what some call the first world, globalization is about the deepening of commodity relations, the privatization of public services, the search for cheaper and more productive labor, coping with crises of over-accumulation and under-consumption, and contraction of space and time – all of which stem from an ideology seemingly devoid of other options (Moore, 2001; Harvey, 2000). Globalization is different in Africa. There, even after over a century of colonial and postcolonial entanglement with the world economy, the consolidation and expansion of capitalism is still in process (Leys, 1996). And according to Berger (2001), there remains little of the ‘national’ shell for development in Africa. Deliberately confusing past and present tense, Hardt and Negri (2000) state that ‘the productive relationship with the “dark continent” serves as the economic foundation of the European nation-state’ and ‘the central motor for the creation of capitalism came from outside England, from global commerce, and more accurately, from conquest’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 115, 257). In Africa, the era of state consolidation was over before it even started to get off the ground. It is being replaced by warlordism in places like Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, connected tightly to the global circuits of coltan and debt-collection (Reno, 2003; Duffield, 2000).

International actors, according to Autesserre (2005), picture the DRC as an inherently violent country where violence is always expected:

 Violence was the usual mode of relations between the Congolese state and its population. . . . The Congo was a country with a history of abuses and a constant pattern of violence against the population by people in power . . . therefore, the violence, and the ‘armed men’ . . . preying on the population as we can observe it now were present ‘in the same way’ as they had ‘always’ been before . . . a high level of rape has always existed in the Congo. (from a Belgian diplomat in DRC, quoted by Autesserre, 2005)

The Congo is perceived as a country in a state of quasi-anarchy and chaos, and as a theatre of senseless and horrific violence. And as we have seen, contemporary scholars tend to replicate tired stereotypes of Africa by emphatically coupling state dysfunction and societal savagery.
While these scholars point to powerful tendencies towards violence and conditions of suffering that obtain in many African states, they fail to see that even though suffering has been terrible in many instances in places like DRC, this fact does not mean that there is no governance whatsoever. The case of the Nande in the North Kivu region of the DRC, for example, shows that in a chaotic situation or in a situation of protracted and proliferating fragmented violence, it is always possible to construct a sense of political and economic order, relying on agencies of governance other than the state. Indeed, new kinds of regulations and governance practices, which have emerged from the retreat of state power, are shaping the ongoing postcolonial state formation.

**NANDE POST-STATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES**

The Nande region is located in northeast DRC. Nande people occupy the territory of Beni-Lubero, two of the five regions\(^9\) of the North Kivu Province of DRC. The case of the Nande is very interesting because in the absence of effective state sovereignty and in the presence of numerous armed contenders for power, Nande traders have managed to build and protect self-sustaining, prosperous, transnational economic enterprises in eastern Congo.

Notwithstanding (or because of) such bad political and economic environments, the Nande have taken over multiple functions previously assigned to the state. They fix and maintain roads leading in and out of Butembo. Each trader is personally responsible for 50 km of road to repair. They organize tollgates where cars pay according to weight. Traders build bridges, pay militias, feed them and house them. The Federation of Traders of Butembo (*Fédération des Entrepreneurs du Congo*, FEC) has its court where disputes are settled. Many litigations concerning succession and land ownership are solved in the traders’ court rather than the state court. Nande traders have built what is now the biggest mayoral office in the country. They have distributed food, clothes and medicine to refugees from the troubled region of Ituri and contributed substantially to the construction and the maintenance of schools such as Université Catholique du Graben, the Catholic university, and Université des Grand Lacs, the Protestant university. Health centers such as Hôpital Matanda and many other healthcare institutions (orphanage and nutrition centers) receive drugs imported by traders. However, Nande traders are, at the same time, the financiers of the wars around them. Minerals such as gold, coltan, wolfram, cassiterite, etc., which fuel and sustain the war in eastern DRC, are usually sold to Nande traders, sometimes in exchange for weapons. These mixed contributions of Nande traders to the development activities of their region as well as in the war ravaging the surrounding regions reveal the tension at the heart of the new forms of life emerging from the debris of the Congolese state.\(^9\)

The origins of the Nande trust network have been considered from the perspective of the ’Protestant’ work ethic,\(^10\) which Weber famously considered as the basis of capitalist development in Europe. Nande traders did indeed learn from their Baptist missionaries the spirit of saving and free enterprise that considerably facilitated their initial economic development. However, these Protestant associations supplied more than a mere ‘ethos’: strong social ties consolidated a close circle of business partnerships rooted in the security of interpersonal trust. This friendship was extended to middlemen in each stage of the trade. The political turmoil of the Zaïrian state in the 1960s and 1970s and the economic mismanagement of the 1970s and 1980s ultimately gave the Nande trust network its
outlook and structure. Colonial and postcolonial retail trade gave rise to the emergence of commercial middlemen. Today, the story of Nande economic success has unfolded amidst the civil war and the disintegration of the central government, but in the form of an alliance between traders and the Catholic Church.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

Why should one discuss the Catholic Church when the vast majority of traders are Protestants and have been reared with a Baptist work ethic, as we have seen? Despite the fact that traders had become the lawmakers and the legitimate power brokers, the most powerful single person in Butembo is the Roman Catholic Bishop of Butembo, Mgr Mechisedech Sikulu Paluku. Everyone in Butembo knows that the real decision-makers in the city are the Roman Catholic hierarchy and the traders. Many projects in Butembo have been realized by the initiative of the Church and the traders with a very minimum intervention of the state. There is, for example, a prison run by state authorities. But, as I have seen, a priest can have someone jailed in the prison without following any due process. During my interview with the Mgr Sikulu, I dared to ask him if he considered himself to be a ‘Mwami’, a traditional chief. His answer was: ‘No’, but, he added, ‘nothing could be decided in Butembo without me being consulted and giving the final approval, that is how things work; the elders have the last word.’ Why is a Catholic bishop so powerful in a city where the dominant elite are Protestant traders? The answer is to be found in the 1970s when the former Bishop of Butembo, Mgr Emmanuel Kataliko, played a very critical role in reconciling two opposed branches of Baptists. What exploded in the 1970s between the Baptists who where dubbed ‘progressists’ and those who were named ‘traditionalists’ was a conflict that had actually been accumulating since the colonial period. The conflict originally involved whether to accept or to refuse the colonial government’s education subsidies.

The debate on education subsidies

In the late colonial period, an urgent question for the Baptist missionaries was how to finance the educational improvements and yet remain consistent with their mission’s professed philosophy. The question was whether or not to accept government subsidies for schools. It was an issue that would increasingly become a source of discontent among Africans during the decade of the 1950s. Catholic schools had enjoyed the benefits of state subsidies since the mid-1920s and for years members of the Congo Protestant Council had been lobbying for similar benefits, arguing that Protestant subjects of the colony paid taxes but got no educational benefits in return (Stonelake, 1937, quoted in Nelson, 1992). In 1947, the Belgian parliament finally approved a plan for subsidizing Protestant mission-sponsored schools, and these became available to mission groups in 1948. Some Protestant mission groups welcomed the subsidies, but others, including the Baptist missionaries in Butembo, took a strong stand against them.

Before independence, general educational achievement in the country was significant at the primary school level but severely constricted beyond that. In 1957 there were 1250 million students in 26,000 primary schools but only 20,000 students in 300 secondary schools, plus an additional 11,000 students in 340 technical schools. A paternalistic colonial plan raised the educational level of a substantial portion of the
population. At the same time, it was being followed in an effort to prevent the formation of a small cadre of dominating indigenous elites at the top. Widespread development of secondary schools began in the early 1950s (Merriam, 1961, quoted in Nelson, 1992). At the time of independence, however, there were only three people with post-graduate degrees.

Protestants in Kivu received a disproportionate amount of financial backing from the US for the orphanage and school for mulatto children (established by Hurlburt, Sr). There was a growing resentment on the part of Africans over favoritism shown for these children, especially the English education that they received. With the disparity in levels of education being offered at most Baptist mission-sponsored schools and the school for mulatto children, as well as Catholic-sponsored schools, the issue of subsidies continued to percolate in the church. Graduates having received five-year certificates from Baptist mission schools found that, when they applied for jobs outside the mission, their credentials were not recognized. Many government clerical jobs were going to graduates of Catholic schools, as were jobs with mining firms, plantation owners, foreign merchants, and the military; and the higher standard of living and legal privileges being afforded these people were becoming increasingly evident to members of the Baptist community. Such salaried clerical workers were beginning to form a significant new professional class in the colony known as the ‘evolués’. Having had the benefit of a secondary education, fluency in French, and experience working in clerical positions, these professionals enjoyed the status of a partially Europeanized class above the rest of the population. There were few members of the Baptist community who would have qualified for ‘evolué’ status; the feeling that they had been left behind began to develop.

After independence, there was a rise in the political consciousness among the population at large. The volatile situation that existed in the Congo on the eve of independence, the rapid disintegration of central government authority after independence, and the occupation of the country by UN troops is well known (Young, 1965; Merriam, 1961). What followed was five years of political instability not only on the national level but also on the provincial and local levels. In the Kivu, the two groups of Protestants – the ‘progressists’ (liberals) and traditionalists – were not only split but eventually engaged in a fratricidal struggle. In 1975, the tensions became a real war. That is when Mgr Kataliko, the Catholic bishop, stepped in to reconcile the two camps. He conducted his mission so well that all the Baptists, ‘progressists’ and conservatives, have remained very grateful and respectful of the bishop. His successor, Mgr Melchisedech Sikulu, inherited the same sentiment of respect and gratitude from Protestants, including current traders. The Catholic Church, therefore, plays a very interesting role in Nande’s social and political landscape.

While it continues to form part of transnational religion, with its hierarchy, missions, and objectives, the Catholic Church became increasingly implicated in the maintenance and negotiation of local political and developmental order during the troubled period of the civil war in the DRC. The Catholic Church in Butembo remains constantly engaged in the condemnation of military violence and human rights abuse, notably through its ‘Peace and Justice’ commissions. However, the Catholic Church in Butembo has evolved into a powerful national political actor, influencing military and political decisions. In March 2001, Butembo Bishop Melchisedec initiated the International
Peace Symposium during which participants asked for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the DRC and denounced the ‘massacres’ and plundering of the Congo wealth. In 2003, when the Ugandan-backed rebel leader Jean Pierre Bemba tried to invade Butembo in an operation named ‘Effacer le Tableau’, Mgr Melchisedec Sikulu with Dr Jackson Basikania, co-ordinator of the NGO Programme d’Assistance aux Pygmés en RDC (PAR-RDC), were the first to contact Agence France Press to accuse Bemba’s soldiers of horrific acts of violence and cannibalism, crimes committed especially during the occupation of Mambasa. According to ongoing conversations in Butembo, the current mayor of Butembo, Wabunga Zebede, was appointed by the bishop with the agreement of the traders. True or not, the fact of the matter remains that there seems to be a viable local organization run by this triumvirate of Church, traders and weak state officials.

The Church is a powerful piece of the puzzle in the Nande social organization. Roman Catholic priests, more than their Protestant counterparts (pastors), constitute an active religious elite, but most of the time they are in complicity with traders and, sometimes, at the expense of other postcolonial elites, particularly the customary and intellectual elites. There is a growing division between social classes: peasants, workers, and underpaid educated professionals are directing their frustrations at traders whom they increasingly view as being exploitative. However, the way the capitalist class of traders deals with its hegemonic situation and how its efforts impact other classes remains a critical issue in the development of the Nande community.

The production of economic goods such as coffee and gold and the production of non-economic goods, such as quasi-family relations with Arabs in Dubai, Chinese in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Gouazoug, and Indonesians in Jakarta, have dynamized their community and given traders the status of power brokers in the region. The success of the Nande entrepreneurial elite in Butembo calls for a critical departure from the excessive fetishization of the centrality of state power in accounts of the ascendancy of an effectively global, neo-imperial sovereignty. The import-export capacities of the Nande trading network beg for more attention to the pluralities of governance domains within a dynamic reality of statehood. Indeed, the absence of government does not necessarily mean the absence of governance. But as Tilly notes:

The history record suggests that where government collapses, other predators spring up. In the absence of effective governmental power, people who control substantial concentrations of capital, coercion, or commitment generally use them to forward their own ends, thus creating new forms of oppression and inequality. (Tilly, 2006: 24)

Nande traders seem to have captured the extractive power of the region. As the new powerbrokers, they are now forcing their way into capturing the social surplus. This latter move is not going unchallenged. But since this question is outside the scope of this article, let us come back to the current images of the Congo which ignore these new dynamics of the conflict and the emergence of new post-state loyalties and self-governance to retain only the Conradian picture of the DRC.
TWO FALLACIES
How did this current picture of the Congo come about? What are the above analyses of postcolonial African states missing?

As we will see, these views often interpret African states in terms of their failure to adhere to a Weberian model of the rational-legal state, and their limited capacity with respect to resource extraction, social control, or policy implementation. Max Weber (1978: 54) defined the state as a

ruling organization [which] will be called ‘political’ insofar as its existence and order is continuously safeguarded within a given territorial area by the threat and application of physical force on the part of the administrative staff.

Weber’s conception of the rationalization of the state identifies legibility as the process par excellence for making everything knowable by requiring consistent and regular formalities, such as a census, for quantifying and qualifying the population, and mandatory individualized identities and names, combining abstraction (everything is part of an abstracted mass) with singularization (each individual person has his or her fixed location in time and space) (Scott, 1998). Thus, European political theology has bestowed the state with both a quality of transcendence and a related monopoly over violence (Abrams, 1988). African states are thought to have failed to adhere to this Weberian conception of the state as a rationalized administrative form of political organization.

In this rationalized vision of political life, the state is imagined as an always incomplete project that must constantly be spoken of – and imagined – through an invocation of wilderness, lawlessness, and savagery that not only lies outside its jurisdiction but also threatens it from within (Das and Poole, 2004). European colonialism sought to impose and institutionalize precisely this model of statehood. The perception of the Congo as an inherently violent country, and the assumption that when a state is politically and economically unstable, and the government weak or absent, all will suffer, stem from a misleading Eurocentric conception of statehood and are empirically contradicted by facts on the ground. In the following pages, I will show that these perceptions are based upon two fallacies.

First, simply to treat African states as incomplete or failed obscures the production of political order outside the framework of the postcolonial state (it is a view of the state as seen from above, indeed from the standpoint of the state itself). The central fallacy stemming from this obfuscation is the conflation of a collapsed top-down state with a collapsed society. The lack of government does not necessarily mean the lack of governance. The latter may be provided by non-state agents and involve other types of loyalties than the national or statist ones. I argue that the demise of state power has allowed for the emergence of governance on the part of new ethnic trading networks, giving ethnicity a revitalized power in Congolese society. However, this rise has not been because of an utter absence of the state but in key aspects comes through an alliance with state forces. Against those scholars who see only warlords emerging in a situation of state collapse and failure, I argue that these new groups represent a complex redefinition of the relations between a state and its citizenry in which the state has had to reorient where it asserts its limited power, but is nonetheless still present. The Nande,
used as an example of a group that has emerged partly ‘because’ of state absence, are better understood as complexly intertwined with the state.

I am using the case of the Nande not to argue against the concept of ‘failed state’ as such, but to show that beyond the disintegration of the ‘Weberian model of state’ – which actually has never taken root in Africa – what is happening in places like DRC is the production of new social arrangements anchored on endogenous elements of conceptualization, such as ethnic structures. The latter create an economic and social framework based on institutions other than those of ‘state modernity’. By filling up public space with loyalties other than national loyalty, the emerging ethnic structures create different kinds of harmony between monopolies of violence, of distribution of resources, and political representation.

Indeed, there is a DRC state to which the Nande are attached. The university degrees obtained in the Nande cities of Butembo and Beni are validated by the central government in Kinshasa. The Nande do not want to secede from the Congo, however, the Nande capitalist class welcomes the sort of frail neoliberal national state that is apparently on the agenda of the global corporations interested in the DRC’s resources as well as their caretakers in the US, European, and Chinese governments, and also the UN. The ‘Nande model’ can be identified as a distinctly post-post-colonial, post-civil war, post-nationalist model – along the lines of ‘let the free market do its thing’, and ‘as if by an invisible hand’ the whole society will benefit. The Nande’s newly found desire for government at a distance and governance through local communitarian mechanisms can be understood to articulate perfectly a kind of neoliberalism whereby a weak national state serves as a hollow shell providing a minimum of security and stability for otherwise unhindered capital accumulation, where the so-called free market is entirely unencumbered, and in which local communities and networks are free from the onerous regulation, interference, and impositions of a state that might otherwise, if only occasionally, be an impediment to plunder.

In other words, Nande people do not desire full autonomy or complete separation from the DRC state, and they do not seek anything resembling a Nande ‘national’ self-determination but, rather, welcome the stabilization of the national state, but only insofar as it will be a relatively ‘weak’ and unobtrusive one because it leaves them unencumbered by state surveillance and the unwelcome taxation of their transnational and cross-border trade. In short, they prefer an arrangement not very different from the situation that has persisted in various forms throughout the recent decades (even back into the Mobutu era). This implies that the Nande capitalist class welcomes the same sort of frail neoliberal national state on the agenda of the global corporations in the DRC’s resources.

To sum up, in the past ten years endemic conflict has given rise to the collapse of public authority and the brutal disintegration of the formal state in the DRC. The facts about this are well known – four million dead, entire zones of the country controlled by foreign armies, the withdrawal of the state from effective presence in multiple regions. In the midst of this chaos, however, certain ethnic groups have been able to take advantage of the absence of the state in order to prosper and institute new forms of order and development. Some groups continue to suffer but others, especially the Nande in northeastern Congo, manage not only to insulate themselves from violence nearby but also to prosper in their transnational economic enterprises.
The Catholic University of Butembo, with its three schools of Law, Civil Engineering, and Medicine, has continued to function since its establishment ten years ago by the Roman Catholic bishop of Butembo, Monsignor Kataliko. In spite of civil war, people in Butembo are building a new airport ten miles south of Beni, as well as a hydroelectric dam to electrify their region. Perhaps, the reason for this development is that Nande traders participate extensively in the ‘illegal’ gold trade in South East Asia and the Persian Gulf, as well as trade in coffee, beans and potatoes throughout the region. They make use of ethnic ties, investing their wealth in productive enterprise and in trade. Nande traders furnish a particularly striking instance, therefore, of successful social organization outside the state and of the role of transnational networks in this process.

Secondly, it would also be a fallacy to suggest that the Nande ‘model’ is an alternative to the incapacities of the postcolonial state to secure peace and to deliver on the promises of liberalism. Rather, by creating a historical reconstruction of how this picture has come about, and most importantly, by drawing inspiration from McGaffey’s earlier work in the same Nande region, this study defies these presumptions, but not in ways we might expect. I am not painting a rosy picture of life, insisting that people do get along, that small isolated societies manage to function day-to-day outside of the state apparatus. Contrary to such presumptions, I have also critically suggested that a new neoliberal utopian vision of a supposedly self-governing and market-driven Nande network – engaged in their own egoistic pursuits and enacting their own forms of governance without the presence of an arbiter state – presents itself falsely as a panacea (the solution to the state disintegration).

STATEHOOD AND THE NANDE EXAMPLE

Just as Christ is the intermediary to whom man attributes all his own divinity and all his religious bonds, so the state is the intermediary to which man confides all his non-divinity and all his human freedom. (Marx, 1978[1843]: 32)

The political state, in relation to civil society, is just as spiritual as is heaven in relation to earth. It stands in the same opposition to civil society, and overcomes it in the same manner as religion overcomes the narrowness of the profane world; i.e. it has to acknowledge it again, re-establish it, and allow itself to be dominated by it. (Marx, 1978[1843]: 34)

At the heart of the current picture of the DRC stands a flawed understanding of the state itself, its functions and its performance. Marx, in language which recalls another German philosopher, Ludwig Feuerbach, shows us that the state is nothing other than ‘an imaginary sovereign infused with an unreal universality’, and this is indeed what Marx called ‘the sophistry of the political state itself’ (Marx, 1978[1843]: 34). But which state (or what aspects of the state) is Marx critiquing? Which of these virtually theological aspects of statehood have led, on the occasion of their poor performance, to the qualification of African countries as weak, fragile, criminalized, failed and collapsed?

In his Seeing like a State, James Scott (1998) gives an interesting commentary on the modern state against which African states, in general, and the DRC, in particular, are judged. For Scott, the state seeks to make everything legible for administrative and
economic purposes. By legible, Scott refers to the desire to make everything knowable through codifying procedures such as population registries and mandatory last names. Drawing on Foucault, Scott writes: ‘Legibility implies a viewer whose place is central and whose vision is synoptic’ (Scott, 1998: 79). The inverse of legibility is resistance, what is not known or illegible, and not predictable. As Scott writes: ‘illegibility has been and remains a reliable resource for political autonomy’ (p. 54). According to Scott, bureaucratic logic and commercial logic are the same for the modern state. For Scott, the best analogy of the state and its performances is the management of forestry. Scientific forestry management techniques in the late 18th century rested on principles of uniformity (monocrop culture), simplification (weeding out unnecessary growth), and aesthetic regimentation. These regulations led to forests with better legibility: ‘the forest itself need not be seen; it could be “read” accurately from the tables and maps of the forester’s office’ (Scott, 1998: 15). Similarly, communal landholdings were changed in favor of more grid-like land tenure structures that facilitated taxation. Cities were planned to be more legible from the outside (to the state) but with ‘no necessary relationship to the order of life as it is experienced by its residents’ (p. 58). Simplification, abstraction, and homogenization are three particular categories of logic which defined modernity from the 18th century onward. The modern state is political in so far as it is oriented toward securing its order over peoples and spaces. Modern states view the past as an impediment to be transformed for a better future, and it is this new knowledge that will prevail over local and practical knowledge.

While for Scott there is only the divide between the legible and the illegible, the present study takes place in the space between the two domains. Nande practices and politics of social, as well as economic, life force a rethinking of the state from the margins. In keeping with this reconception, I push the boundaries between legal and illegal, center and periphery, by redefining the so-called failed state. The evidence provided in this study shows that states in Africa are built, in many instances, on practices that are ‘illegible’. In fact, it is on the border between norm and exception, legality and illegality, that the business of sovereignty is conducted (Ferme, 2004: 87). As the Nande case shows, the DRC state is failed only for those who see from the center and those who follow, without further ethnographic analysis, the statist narrative from the center. To paraphrase Das and Poole (2004), it is from its margins – both territorial (border with Uganda) and legal (bypassing custom services) – that the Nande are overwriting the DRC’s legibility while re-emerging from its disintegration.

However, it would be a fallacy to imagine the Nande society as small and isolated communities that could get along and function day-to-day – if left well enough alone, they do not need a state apparatus to function. The real picture is much more complicated than that. In the Nande region, the state is most certainly weak or even absent. Nande have, however, thrived within this context. Many Nande have grown rich from their lucrative international trade in and out of the region. To call their actions ‘corrupt’, however, offers only a one-dimensional view of what is in fact a paradoxical situation with a complicated history. In fact, Nande traders do ‘give back’ economically for the benefit of the region as a whole. Some Nande amass fortunes, but they invest considerable portions of their profits back into the community (MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga, 2000; author’s field research, 2006), such that the region has a thriving economy, decent schools, and health care. Rather than orienting their economy westward toward
the Congo River and the Congolese capital at Kinshasa, they orient their activities instead to the east along much older trade routes; and they are hardly confined to East Africa but, rather, have strong ties that take them regularly to the Middle East and East Asia. This is very much the conclusion MacGaffey reached in research conducted during the 1980s; however, the current study has been conducted in the context of civil war, while MacGaffey’s research was done in the context of mismanagement of the economy while the Mobutu regime remained well-installed in power. The present study extends the previous research into a new era of both catastrophic suffering and remarkable global connections.

The Nande’s commercial dynamism in the unpromising political and economic environment of the DRC forces a rethinking of state power and the notion of ‘survival’. The Nande anthropological site is one where law, economy, politics and other state practices are guided by additional forms of regulation and loyalties. This study responds to the anthropological invitation (Das and Poole, 2004) to rethink the boundaries between center and periphery, public and private, legal and illegal, that run through the heart of even the most ‘successful’ European liberal state.

The present research is located on the margins of what is accepted as the territory of unquestioned state control and legitimacy. Places like Butembo, the Nande capital city, are simultaneously sites where nature can be imagined as wild and uncontrolled and where the state is constantly trying to reestablish modes of order and law-making. It is a site of practices where law and other forms of regulation and governance emanate from the pressing needs of Nande people to secure economic survival and of the Nande commercial elite to secure their own political control and social order. This study departs from the ubiquitously expanded and reified notion of the state as a greater or lesser monopoly of ‘legitimate’ coercive violence, exercised spatially over a limited territory. The research site shows that the state is never the unique and exclusive form of social relations, which are ‘always un-predetermined, agonistic, and unresolved’. These ‘relations of struggle’ entail a ‘full panoply of contests over objectification and fetishization of human productive powers as alien forces of domination’ for which ‘the state tends . . . to be the hegemonic manifestation’ (De Genova, 2007: 442; Holloway, 1994). The Nande region is one of the many places where the state is continually both experienced and undone through the illegibility of its own practices, documents, and words. Unlike in the rationalized world of Weberian abstractions, the DRC state, as seen from its margins, is inscrutable, incoherent, unpredictable, and unreliable. But to characterize these features as ‘failure’ is merely to retain and recapitulate a great many statist fantasies.

In the tradition of political science, the state is taken as a basic, and largely unquestioned, category. Categories such as authority, rights or sovereignty are generally discussed in the tradition of political theory, but the state, as a category, is simply assumed. The theoretical challenges defined in this study are precisely to dissolve the state as a category in the Kantian sense; it entails understanding the state not as a thing in itself but as a social form, a form of social relations (Holloway, 1994). By defining the state as a social phenomenon, as a form of social relations, i.e. relations between people, the study recognizes the fluidity, the unpredictability and the instability of this category. Indeed, these relations have solidified certain forms that appear to have acquired their own autonomy, their own dynamic. By taking these forms (state, money, kinship or ethnicity) as given, some academic disciplines have indeed contributed to
their apparent rigidity. The state, then, appears rigid, and the classic Weberian conception of the state treats that semblance of rigidity as a given and positive fact. As the present study will show, after first displaying how the debate on the state has evolved within African scholarship, the notion that African states have failed or collapsed is part of the same movement to reify and fetishize the colonially imposed Weberian model of statehood.

STATE FAILURE AND STATE COLLAPSE

In the dominant political science literature, state ‘collapse’ refers to the crumbling of institutions while state ‘failure’ is defined by the non-performance of key state functions (Zartman, 1995). State collapse is a situation where the structure, authority, law and political order have fallen apart. State failure, on the other hand, begs the question of what the core functions of the state actually are, and these may vary from minimal concern with basic security to respect for the rights of citizens, and even the provision of welfare (Clapham, 2002). In 1994, Rwanda qualified as a failed state because it failed to assure protection to much of its population, but it had not collapsed; on the contrary, highly disciplined agents of the state pursued the task of murdering many of its citizens with incredible efficiency. According to Neil Cooper (2002), two main factors explain contemporary incidents of state collapse. It can be understood as a post-Cold War re-ordering of the political map consequent to the failure of communist states (e.g. Yugoslavia) and the retraction of superpower patronage (e.g. Zaire/DRC). The current phenomena of state collapse can also be viewed as an acute manifestation of a more general and contemporary crisis of the state precipitated by the inequities of globalization under neoliberalism, privatization, and the growing influence of transnational organizations (Cooper, 2002).

The decline of superpower military aid and its patronage in general is salient in explaining the ‘collapse’ of the Zairian state. The post-independence period in the DRC was shaped by the international context of Cold War rivalry. In order to secure access to Congo minerals, the US and European powers financed the Mobutu regime during the Cold War. Thanks to this Cold War (neo-colonial) patronage, Mobutu was able to carry out a patrimonial form of state inherited from the colonial period, in which he maintained his power and influence through a monopoly of state resources, disbursed as rewards for political support through a network of patron-client relations. Beginning in the late 1980s, the practice of patrimonialism came under growing stress; declining internal resources and new conditions for external patronage announced the end of broad-based patronage networks in large parts of Africa (Reno, 1995). The nation-state model of development in Africa may have aimed at national unity and integration, but the way in which resources were distributed and power was consolidated sparked competition over dwindling resources.

At a global level, the relatively stabilizing role the Cold War played in relation to the national development project and the postcolonial ordering of the globe had abruptly ended by the early 1990s (Berger, 2000). With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Soviet Empire in 1989, which announced the end of the Cold War, the US and Europeans had no reason to continue helping a Mobutu regime which had devolved into an increasingly dysfunctional kleptocracy. The lack of internal legitimacy for Mobutu’s regime was compensated for by the support received from the West and by the fact that
he was granted access to international aid channels. With the suspension of Cold War support, the Zairian state simply collapsed.

As Marysse (2004) puts it, while there is now a broad academic consensus on the significance of political factors in Africa’s crisis, there is less agreement on the role of foreign aid and its influence on political elites and economic regress. Indeed, as Van de Wall (2001) contends, it is not so much the magnitude of aid as the way in which it is managed that is disruptive and has diminished the state’s capacity to run its own affairs. Van de Wall thinks that the management of aid is as problematic as the volume of aid itself. However, what he fails to explain is why instability and violence have increased in the post-Cold War era.

In his work, Robert Bates (2001) tries to go beyond explaining the crisis to explain how crisis leads to conflict. For Bates, to study the political economy of development is indeed to study prosperity and violence. Bates finds an intrinsic link between the prevalence of violence (including the economic violence of predation) and regression in the economic arena. What Bates does not explain is why violence and economic regress seem to be occurring in Africa more commonly and on a larger scale since the fall of the Berlin Wall. If the state collapses and wages become insignificant while social security is non-existent, and city dwellers can no longer rely on use-value production, how can people survive? In the Congo, this predicament eventually led to Africa’s first international war.15

The collapse of the Congolese state meant that the military was no longer being paid. Consequently, they stopped functioning as an army and began to exact money from the population. The war was triggered by the combination of this crumbling of the Congo’s armed forces and the spill-over of the Rwandan civil war into Zaire, which spelled the end of the story of the state in former Zaire. But, in most analyses, little grounding is provided as to what actually lay behind this evident breakdown of public authority in the DRC. And such grounding appears more necessary than ever when looking at the continually problematic nature of the state in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, a continent beset with endemic warfare.

The academic discussion of state ‘failure’ and state ‘collapse’ seems also situated in a growing deadlock between classical state-centered approaches, which keep pointing to functional problems, and more social insights that try to explain other political and economic loyalties emerging in the context of weak state performance. While contradictory explanations often exist about what may lead states to collapse or fail, little is provided about the new social arrangements that lay behind the evident disintegration of the state.

Most importantly, it seems that most scholars of state breakdown seem to have a Weberian ideal view of statehood and its derivates that is largely contested by facts on the ground. Indeed for the discourse on state failure and state collapse, viable states are, of course, an entirely unexamined and uncritical normative good. Three principal misconceptions have led the literature on state failure or state collapse.

First, the idea of state failure itself is misleading. It gives the false impression that if a state is now falling apart, it may be assumed to have been previously well-integrated, fully functioning, stable, and efficacious. Nowhere in Africa has the state approached the Weberian ideal because the Weberian project is a rigidified form of social relations emanating from a particular, local and context-specific construction from a certain historical period in the West.
There is no general formula for the success of state projects. They always have to respond to local historical specificities (i.e., the conditions and relations of struggle). The DRC state remains profoundly contingent; it was born in a colonial carve-up, and threatened from the time of independence by secessionist movements at the provincial level (Jackson, 2002). The DRC was partitioned by war from 1998 to 2003. Now, and in spite of elections, the DRC is in an unprecedented situation of neither war nor peace (Raeymaekers, 2005). Thus, statehood ought to be regarded as a relative concept (Tull, 2003). The historical specificities of the North Kivu region and the socio-political particularities of the Nande transnational formation illuminate something crucial and potentially decisive for the DRC as a whole, and perhaps also for the relation of sub-Saharan Africa to the global regime of capital accumulation.

Second, there is confusion between institutional breakdown and social collapse. Zartman (1995) draws an equation between the collapse of the state and the collapse of society and thinks that in a ‘weak’ society there exists a general inability to refill the institutional gaps left by withering government structures. Therefore, he concludes that the organization and allocation of political assets easily fall into the hands of ‘warlords and gang leaders’ who often make use of ‘ethnic elements’ as sources of identity and control in the absence of an overriding social contract binding the citizen to the state. As Raeymaekers (2005) puts it, society and the state are placed on a developmentalist ‘continuum’, where one stage of failure almost automatically leads to another. Indeed, collapse of ‘government’ does not necessarily mean collapse of ‘governance’. It means the emergence of new ‘political complexes’; new forms of domination may emerge around the introduction of new frameworks of political and economic accountability and control (Doombos, 2002), but so may new forms of contestation and autonomy.

Third, some humanitarian theorists understand ‘state collapse’ as a kind of ‘development malaise’ to be reversed by a combination of smart sanctions, external assistance and institution-building. More often these interventions involve a radical shift in the political and economic structures of the societies that stand on the receiving end, including, on occasion, the wholesale take-over of a number of services traditionally associated with the functioning of the modern state (Clapham, 2002; Ottaway, 2002). As Duffield argues:

Rather than the developmental rhetoric of scarcity or breakdown, one has to address the possibility that protracted instability is symptomatic of new and expanding forms of political economy; a function of economic change rather than a developmental malaise. It is difficult for development models of conflict to convey such a sense of innovative expansion. (Duffield, 1998: 71)

This brings us to an even more important question – whether or not ‘real’ capitalist development on the margins of a troubled center is possible.

To sum up, I argue that generally analyses of African states in terms of ‘state failure’ or ‘state collapse’ overlook the internal dynamics of communal conflict. They neglect the change in the definition and negotiation of power and authority at the local level. The issue of ‘state collapse’ needs to be placed in its specific social setting. In the Nande region of eastern DRC, for example, new forms of governance have taken place in the
gap left by state retreat. The question is, then: how do state and non-state actors, local and external forces, interact to produce order and authority in a situation where the state has vanished? What sorts of actors are involved? What strategies are used? How stable, extensive, and productive are various forms of order and authority? Whose interests are served? Whose interests matter? How is the community being reconstructed? Into whose image?

The following pages will answer these questions by arguing for the continued importance of more ‘informal’ ways of creating political order and economic management in sub-Saharan Africa. This claim is not so much a reaffirmation or a rejection of the African state as such, but rather the result of a detailed analysis of societal responses to processes of state implosion, as well as elementary insights into the working of authority and the actors engaged in its formulation. I look at the strategies used by Nande actors to deal with the violent transformation of the DRC state. How have particular social forces adapted to changes in the state framework? And when do more gradual quantitative changes culminate in the emergence of something qualitatively new such that a national territory continues to exist, but without a state? What strategies have the Nande developed at a ‘quotidian’ level to confront their physical and economic insecurity in the wake of the brutal transformation of the DRC state? I examine the forms of life that emerge for the Nande from the assumed debris of state disintegration: trading networks, new elites, new forms of ethnicity, new local-global connections.

THE ROLE OF INFORMALITY IN THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE STATE

The practices of transgressing state borders and institutions are usually qualified as an ‘economy of fraud’, a dimension of what is referred to as the ‘informal economy’. Morris and Newman have established criteria with which to distinguish what they call ‘the official market’, characterized as ‘trading by authorized (licensed) partners: compliance with official market regulations, conformity to official prices’. The ‘parallel market’ is characterized as ‘trading by unauthorized (unlicensed) partners: non-compliance with official marketing regulations, trading at non-official prices’ (Morris and Newman, 1989). What distinguishes the informal economy from the formal one is the absence of statistics and trade documents and a disregard for norms and regulations. In the early 1980s, with the weakening of the state’s administrative capacities in Zaire, MacGaffey (1987) noted that various class sectors began to compete for the appropriation of the surplus. What then emerged is what William Reno (1995) calls ‘the informal market’, while MacGaffey discerns a ‘second economy’. The concept of informal markets or second economy refers to economic activities that are unmeasured and unrecorded except by those immediately involved in each transaction. These activities are carried out in a manner to avoid taxation or deprive the state of revenue.

There are activities supposedly controlled by the state but which in fact either evade this control or involve the illegal use of state positions. By this definition the second economy is as much a political as an economic phenomenon. It is a manifestation of class struggle as well as of coping strategies to deal with economic exigency. (MacGaffey, 1987: 23)
The second economy is different from what is usually referred to as the ‘informal sector’, which is understood as dealing chiefly with the self-employment of the urban poor and the migrant population (Sethuraman, 1976). ‘Informal sector’ means the sector of small-scale merchants who follow no regulations and who are not controlled by the state.

However, for De Villers, there is not one form but multiple forms of legality. There is no absence of institutions, but these economic agents refer to institutions which are different from those of the modern state. There are multiple and competing regimes of ‘legality’ or ‘normativity’ that coexist within a space of multiple solidarities or sovereignties. Neither is MacGaffey’s second economy identical with what AbdouMaliq Simone (2004) describes in terms of ‘people as infrastructure’. He refers to the extensive trans-transactional economy that has developed from the range of tactics urban African residents use to deflect constraint, surveillance, and competition and from the sociality employed to increase access to information, destinations, and support. The second economy goes beyond the coping strategies generated by the intensifying immiseration of African urban populations, however. The second economy should not be reduced to a survival economy or to an economy uniquely concerned with those who could not otherwise compete in the world market.

In society-centered analyses, with a focus on the autonomy of informal markets, the second economy tends to be considered an effect of survival strategies. For state-centered approaches, informal markets signal dysfunction. Individual entrepreneurs are still bound to the state because they still live within its monetary circuit. Thus, ‘where MacGaffey finds an “indigenous bourgeoisie” with interests contrary to “the parasites” of the state machinery, others observe a Mafia-like relation between informal market business and officials who sell protection’ (Reno, 1995: 15). State-centered studies focus on the predatory state as the responsible agent for the economic crisis that causes citizens to seek relief from bad policies, opting even for war as a mode of accumulation. If in Zaire the collapse of institutions prompted individual entrepreneurs to seek alternative means of survival, then this study shows how MacGaffey’s autonomous entrepreneurs are evidence of a people’s capacity to reshape society, not only in the wake of the declining ‘predatory Zairian state’ but also in the wake of outright disintegration of the war-torn DRC. Not only in the presence of predation and parasitism, but also in the absence of any effective state and national government, have Nande traders managed to build self-sustaining, prosperous transnational economic enterprises in the eastern Congo. The stakes of this research are defined by showing what these dynamic social forces and informal networks actually mean in terms of producing ‘new social arrangements’, especially where African states have been limited in producing them (Bratton, 1989).

In Africa, the majority of the population makes a living from socio-economic activities of the so-called ‘informal economy’. During the colonial and postcolonial period, Nande people who felt marginalized from the central government (MacGaffey, 1987) resorted to these activities to claim their social rights and to construct an alternative to the existing political and social project. Nande informal or parallel economic activities are deployed in local, regional and transnational markets. If international exchange is concerned with transactions between nation-states, then transnational trade goes beyond state systems.

Nande trade is organized in networks and some of its practices are ‘informal’.17 Their trading activities are deployed in local, regional and transnational markets. Nande
traders never describe these activities as ‘illegal’. They argue that ‘legibility’ and ‘illegibility’, ‘legality’ and ‘illegality’, conjure up the false impression of a state functioning ‘normally’. The Zairian state has failed its people, they reason, so the notion of ‘illegality’ no longer applies because there has not been and still is not a working state. Similarly, the customs service agents who are bribed consider it normal to keep the money for themselves.

For some traders, as long as value was being returned to the region, there was no reason to worry about ‘illegality’ in a corrupt and predatory government (Marysse, 2004). As Mbembe (1992) points out, illegal networks are not only strategies for survival but also a space of resistance against the violence generated by the failure of the postcolonial modes of accumulation, state dictatorship and its distorted episteme of ‘leadership’. Indeed, ‘illegal networks are not only strategies for survival but also a space of resistance against the violence generated by the failure of the postcolonial modes of accumulation, state dictatorship and its distorted episteme of ‘leadership’. Indeed, ‘illegality’, as De Genova (2002) puts it, makes sense only within the framework of a nation-state which produces laws that legalize or criminalize particular practices. As categories, illegality, informality or even ‘criminality’ are forms of social relations in the course of being objectified, and subject to the dynamics of historical struggle over their composition, decomposition and recomposition (Holloway, 1994; De Genova, 2002, 2005). For some traders, likewise, it seems that new forms of social relations generated by new political and historical contexts constitute their particular space of ‘informality’ or ‘illegality’. It is indeed within these grey zones of ‘legality’ and ‘illegality’ that Nande trading activities reshape and reinvent the ‘state’.

This study aims at showing that the images of strife, dissolution, corruption, hideous forms of ethnic factionalism and hatred, and overall general horror that dominate the writings of social scientists who specialize on the DRC, as well as representations of the DRC in the media, come from a particular way of conceiving the state and the concept of sovereignty attached to it. The dominant conception of the state against which the DRC is judged is that of a top-down reified state characterized by legibility (everything is knowable through codifying procedures such as census and population registration), abstraction (everything is part of an abstract mass that the state ultimately can and should regulate), singularization (assigning each individual a fixed location in time and space), and simplification. This way of looking at the state has only two paradigms for operation: legality or illegality. By locating the Nande in the space between the legal and the illegal, the legible and the illegible, this study not only brings to light the intellectual productivity of redefining the borders of the reified modern state but also challenges notions that sovereignty is intrinsically attached to the state.

NON-STATE SOVEREIGNTIES?
The absence of a national set of laws or interests does not mean that there are no rules governing society. Working against the Hobbesian understanding of the pre-state situation as an anarchic and disorganized powerless vacuum, for instance, Evans Pritchard famously characterized the Nuer as ‘organized anarchy’. Rather than recapitulating the primordialist notion of a kind of social order that ostensibly endures from the condition that Hobbes and others depicted as a ‘state of nature’, however, the task of critical social analyses is to discern possible and historically specific conditions for producing socio-political arrangements. Hansen and Stepputat (2006), for example, claim that a key feature of the colonial world was that different registers of sovereignty coexisted and overlapped. Likewise, in many postcolonial societies, sovereign power is

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historically fragmented and distributed among informal but effective networks of local authority.

Relations and interactions between the interdependent subjects of local and translocal networks, such as those of the Nande traders in this study, have intentionally or unintentionally led to a certain type of governance in the absence of a central government, to a kind of sovereignty outside of the state. The state has not vanished entirely, but some of its major functions – monopoly of violence, redistribution of resources, and a certain level of political representation – have been taken over, as we will see, by an alliance of traders, the Catholic Church, and the militias.

Nande traders still operate within the territorial jurisdiction of the DRC state. Their schools are accredited by the central government. Their doctors and lawyers receive permission to practice from the central government. Indeed, the Nande traders are enthusiastic about the reconstruction of the national state. This study shows that several sovereignties and property right systems coexist side by side. However, this multiplicity is inconceivable for those with a normative view of governmental institutions and state sovereignty. To make sense of the current situation in the Nande region, one has to integrate a longer historical perspective and to decipher the continuities of the political economic order in the Congo. The current situation in the DRC is one with no single center. Interlocking, competing, fragile centers of military might, welfare concerns, as well as ethno-religious and local loyalties claim sovereignty over the people. This web of power ties is set against a particular ‘fiction of the state’ that claims legal sovereignty and a monopoly over violence and reacts in the name of national and popular will.

The debates about sovereignty in political science and history tend to be oriented around the notion of national sovereignty. The concept of national sovereignty has remained hegemonic and has been routinely and notoriously used by dictators to suppress all forms of internal demand for reform. However, some scholars have examined the constructed nature of sovereignty claims (Agamben, 1998[1995], Levy et al., 2005[2003]) as well as the character of such claims in developing countries (Roitman, 2001; Clapham, 1996; Jackson, 1990).

Giorgio Agamben situates his reflections on sovereignty in a kind of juridical limbo he calls ‘the state of exception’. For Agamben, it is precisely in its deliberations over ‘the exception’ that the sovereign power of the state is constituted. He shows how the state of exception is normalized and arrangements are extended not despite but because they are devoid of ‘distinction between outside and inside, exception and rule, licit and illicit’ (Agamben, 1998[1995]: 110). In his Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1995), Agamben defines the politicization of bare life, the reification of human life in the political realm, as the defining element of sovereign power. To understand Agamben’s point, it is important to read his work through Marx, as did De Genova (20010), distancing himself from the pervasive fetishization of ‘power’ as synonymous with domination and from ‘sovereignty’ as an exclusive right of the state. The concept of ‘power’ rampant in this reification of notions of state and sovereignty is one defined as potestas – the unchallenged authority of a despotic ruler. It is the power of the sovereign state that captures and cannibalizes its subject. In rejecting a focus on sovereignty and state, Foucault (1996[1980]: 93) contends that the latter are merely endpoints or crystallizations of relations of power that are understood to be ubiquitous and elemental and therefore must be seen from the bottom-up. Power as potestas characterizes the state.
of exception where the sovereign power of the state gives itself the right to dehumanize its subjects and turn their lives into ‘bare life’.

Power as *potestas* is opposed to power as *potentia*, the more elementary power through which human subjects deploy their productive capacities and possibilities. Power as *potentia* is the sort of power Foucault is concerned with when he writes: ‘Power is something that is acquired, seized, or shared, something that one holds on to or allows to slip away; power is exercised. . . . Relations of power . . . have a directly productive role, wherever they come into play. Power comes from below’ (Foucault, 1996[1980]: 94). This sort of power, *potentia* – which, according to De Genova (2010), is an elementary facet of human possibility and productive capability – is ontologically prior to and ultimately autonomous of the reified power of the sovereign state that captures it. The category of bare life is not a simple biological given that ontologically precedes sovereign power, as if in a state of nature, but rather a ‘product of the [biopolitical] machine’ (Agamben in Levy et al., 2005[2003]; De Genova, 2007). The ideal for Agamben is a ‘life in which it is never possible to isolate something such as bare life’. The ideal life is no less than a restitution of human life to its own intrinsic, sovereign (inalienable) power, in a way that effectively suspends and transcends the very distinction between legal and illegal, and which thereby inhabits precisely the zone of indistinction where their opposition collapses (De Genova, 2010). De Genova conceives the notion of sovereignty as an ontological attribute of the human species, anterior to state sovereignty. From this standpoint, sovereignty is never a monopoly of the state.

It is, therefore, possible to adapt the notion of sovereignty to entities such as the Nande traders or other social formations. This study shows that several sovereignties and property right systems can coexist side by side. This idea is inconceivable for those with a normative view of governmental institutions and state sovereignty. Therefore, the study’s ethnography constitutes an anthropological critique of conventional political science analyses that define sovereignty narrowly in terms of ‘the state’.

Sovereignty, as I deploy it, is not just a feature of a state’s relation to other states, but also a social relation between the state and its own diverse population of ostensible ‘citizens’. I employ sovereignty to interrogate the extent to which a state dominates all other power structures within its purported territorial jurisdiction. Even when something close to the Weberian ideal-type of statehood emerges, with a state exercising a monopoly over legitimate violence and serving as a guarantor of social order, the state organizations are still likely to be confronted with parallel or rival organizations that claim authority over certain domains of governance.

For Janet Roitman (2001), these domains of governance are not necessarily divorced from state power. Roitman, whose work considers the emergence of transnational regimes of accumulation and authority dominating the borders of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and the Central African Republic, contends that even though ‘this situation seems “oppositional”, it does not necessarily imply the demise of [the] nation-state in the face of non-national forms of accumulation and power’ (Roitman, 2001: 241). Even though there is antagonism or competition between state regulatory authority and other regional economies, Roitman argues that complicity is also evident insofar as the state is dependent upon these regional economies for rent and means of redistribution. The transnational activities Roitman describes along the Chad basin are conducted with the complicity of the state regulatory authorities. These activities are adopted by the state as
new ways of thought and action inscribed in the same logical order as the nation-state. Thus, in her account, the networks and domains often described as new spaces of sovereignty or emergent sovereignties are simply new configurations of state-sanctioned power. In other words, the question of their discrepant sovereignty is irrelevant.

In the case of transnational networks in the Chad basin, Roitman contends that the state is never absent; therefore, these historically contingent economic practices do not represent new sovereignties in their own right. Roitman views this illegal cross-border trade as a form of political technology constituting that which is to be governed as a conscious regulatory intervention (Roitman, 1998). In a Foucauldian move, Roitman sees informal business as a creative way in which the existing state is metamorphosing. Roitman also cautions that instead of looking at the emerging new figures of power as destabilizing our manner of thinking and exercising power, or forcing us to question whether or not new types of sovereignty are in our midst, we should ask whether or not the intelligibility of the very idea of sovereignty has been destabilized with recent changes in the global political economy (2001: 263).

While it is true that state agents might be implicated in transnational networks of trade, bringing back the presence of the state in a very peculiar way, however, it also remains true that these networks challenge the claims of the state as guarantor of social order and wealth redistribution. These challenges are more or less rigorous depending on the ranking of the state agent who participates in the new modes of economic extraction and redistribution outside the state scheme. Like Roitman, I argue that the state in Africa is not failing, but new modalities of its ‘reappropriation’ are emerging. Power and regulations are remade and complexly develop outside the state. But where I part company with Roitman is about the interpretation according to which new configurations of regulations are part of the state building process. The level of suffering in the region of the Chad basin is so high that anybody who is familiar with the region would question Roitman’s conclusions.

As we will see, there is nothing of the kind in the Nande region. In places like the DRC, where the state has liberalized and abandoned its extractive power, the competing groups of Nande traders monopolize the surplus produced in their region and have been able to dispel state agents through bribes and corruption. With the civil war, the state no longer provides protection and security, so its presence is less needed and easily sidestepped by the traders who organize their own militia groups to assume a coercive function. Here, one can see a case of an effective sovereign entity. Nande are indeed surrounded by lots of suffering due to the war, but the Nande networks, by reinvesting in and (re)producing their community, make things much better than Roitman’s informal regulators on the border of Chad, Cameroon and Nigeria.

Roitman, however, seems to stick to a kind of crystallized notion of the state. She reserves sovereignty as an attribute of the state instead of viewing it as a social relation for which the state is an objectivized form at a certain point in time. Unlike Roitman, I understand sovereignty to be that which is inalienable in the human species. This way of apprehending sovereignty is much closer to the anthropological appreciation of power as potentia. State power has indeed alienated the sovereign productive power of human beings taken collectively. The above interpretation of sovereignty can be adapted to the Nande as a social formation assuming its destiny by deploying its productive economic and political imagination. This study is not about ‘the Nande’ as a naturalized ‘ethnic’
group, but rather about the historically specific social formation that Nande traders have produced and organized around the reconfiguration and mobilization of kinship and ethnic ideologies and practices of ‘Nande’-ness – an ensemble of social relations in which human productive powers and creative capacities are paramount.

This imaginative deployment could, of course, turn into an egotist way for the ascendant Nande capitalist class to realize its sovereign power so that the surrounding communities, or even the Nande laboring classes, are excluded and exploited. Nonetheless, the question of the sovereign status of the networks and new domains of governance is relevant. Indeed, there is always a need for interactions between different sites of sovereignty. Multiple layers of distinct sovereignties coexist with the state as they intersect, reinforce or compete with each other. The intelligibility of each instance of sovereignty is fully deployed only in its relation to others.

The spatial framework of various contentions about state and sovereignty and the inevitable territorial orientation of various projects of state power have required a construction of sovereignty made in the state’s image: territorial sovereignty (Ferguson, 2006: 51). The ‘local’, however, ought not to be interpreted singularly or exclusively in territorial terms, but rather as a point of convergence for various dynamics (Hannerz, 2003). In particular, the local involves a ‘political arena’ where different sovereignties are constantly constructed and deconstructed, and competing spheres of power (as potential) are forged and intersect (Kassimir, 2001). The new production of sovereignty that informs this conception of the local problematizes and challenges the notion that sovereignty is only relevant as state sovereignty within its territory. Thus, the question of frontiers and their transgression can be seen anew.

THE QUESTION OF FRONTIERS
As Birmingham (1992) puts it, frontiers are not barriers but privileged zones of intense economic activity. The degree of illegality, the scale of tax-avoidance and the perceived price to be charged for risk involved will accentuate this intensity. Frontiers are also ideal spaces for rent-seeking, thanks to national disparities between different economic and fiscal systems (Renard and Picouet, 2007). Frontiers have traditionally played an important role in defining trade patterns in the form of precolonial communal and geographical divisions, in colonial frontiers, and in postcolonial borders. The Nande region is indeed located on the old trade roads. The origins of contemporary ‘informal’ transborder activities can be found in precolonal trade patterns. For John Igue (1983), today’s informal economic networks in West Africa, for example, are ‘nothing’ other than the manifestation of the old exchange networks set up by African communities, whose caravan trade was temporarily paralyzed by the laws of the colonial economy. Indeed, parallel transborder trade then resumed or continued after independence in Africa. Two main forces stimulated these cross-border activities: (a) the persistence of porous borders and (b) the continuous harassment – in the form of predatory state officials, customs duties, etc. – and the opportunities of monetary exchange across borders.

State repression against these cross-border activities produced the phenomena of smuggling and intermediary activities existing on these various African borders (Prunier, 1989; Sundstrom, 1974). Omer Mirembe (2005) also locates the origins of the Nande’s transborder economy (and their colonial trade patterns) in Central Africa with the interlacustrian caravan trade. According to Mirembe (2005) and to Raeymaekers (2007),
the Nande migrations from the 17th century onwards were apparently connected to the development of a vast salt trade, which was exploited in the Lake of Katwe, situated on the eastern side of the Semliki Valley. Salt was an important cooking ingredient in the Kivu Mountains and was therefore in high demand, as well as for the preservation of meat and fish in the absence of freezers. Elder Nande people recall that small caravans of around 50 traders crossed the dangerous Semliki plain in search of salt for their former Hima kingdoms on a regular basis. Because of the dangers related to this trade and because of the importance of salt, the search for it became an extremely prestigious enterprise that ensured traders access to social and political status, as well as to brides (Vwakyanakazi, 1982). Butembo was a stop-over on the salt road followed by these caravans (Mirembe, 2005: 115–16).

The trading activities developing along the borders did not only change the social status of people involved, but it also gave them a new sense of periphery. These activities were located in the ‘shadow’ of the colonial and postcolonial administrations, and the frontiers remained a space where goods and articles passed unnoticed. From the 1960s, cash crops such as coffee, tea or papaya latex and some consumer goods imported into the Congo were smuggled systematically into neighboring Uganda by Ismaeli and Indian traders who used the services of armed guards to secure their transborder activities. These activities expanded so quickly that by 1987 it was estimated that between 30 and 35 percent of local coffee production in North Kivu was smuggled to the Ugandan border. Half of the minerals produced in the region followed the same routes to the same destinations. According to Callaghy (2001: 284), ‘almost everything produced or sold in North Kivu was smuggled into Rwanda and Uganda: coffee, vegetables, palm oil, gold, cattle and goat skin, and small merchandise of all kinds’. In the 1990s, when the Congo was severely hit by economic crisis, the Nande, and not only the traders, had no other choice than to unreservedly embrace and enthusiastically extend such transborder activities.

However, given the context of group relations between the two countries, rather than borders, it is important here to talk about boundaries – the point at which ‘something becomes something else’, the point at which the way things are done changes and certain rules of behavior no longer obtain and/or take hold (Migdal, 1998). Boundaries also include important symbolic and social dimensions. Understood this way, boundaries may be described as social constructions which are themselves replete with tension and conflict, and also reflect other spatial and social logics than those of the colonial or even postcolonial state.

This study shows that Nande transborder smuggling networks and their collective efforts of lawbreaking and economic enterprise suggest a renewed spatial logic that produces a personal sense of belonging and identity running parallel, and sometimes in opposition, to dominant state logics. Nande transborder trade seems to provide evidence of what is known as ‘market integration’, that which people bring about for themselves outside official systems. The latter had indeed failed to bring economic development to the region by imposing massive tariffs, border controls, and by the state’s predatory behavior in various profitable economic enterprises. It is generally understood that the Nande reacted this way against the predatory government machineries that had actively denied the realization of their economic and political rights (MacGaffey, 1987). This gives a new light to what is known today as the Nande’s informal, parallel or second...
economy. This indeed raises the important question of a ‘local’ primitive accumulation. Can the second economy constitute the more viable basis of capitalist development or give rise to a ‘peripheral’ primitive accumulation?

**DEVELOPMENT AT THE MARGINS OR PERIPHERAL PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION**

The question the Nande case raises with respect to the state revolves around whether the ‘global’ processes of primitive accumulation hinder ‘local’ ones or not. Do peripheral capitalists (in this case, the Nande bourgeoisie) help or hinder the larger (global) project of primitive accumulation (namely, the expropriation of the peasantry and the creation of a landless proletariat)? These questions are indeed central to the debate on development in Africa.

Neoliberalism’s apostles – victors in the battle against socialism and Keynesianism – proclaim that development could emerge in Africa and in the Third World in general, only with the removal of what they called state impediments. They argue that development, more precisely primitive accumulation, would take off if prices were right, the state stayed in the backseat, and foreign trade and investment were encouraged more than ever before. (Moore, 2004: 88).

Primitive accumulation consists of three closely related processes.\(^1\) First are the processes by which an emerging bourgeoisie accumulates its initial stock of capital in the midst of a disappearing mode of production. In the case of Nande traders, pre-capitalist modes of production have not disappeared completely. There is what Pierre Philippe Rey (1973) calls an articulation of two modes of production, capitalist and non-capitalist. Nande traders rely on customary relations of production to extract gold or to produce cash crops such as coffee, but bring their product to the capitalist market. In other words, the ‘stock’ gained by the new bourgeoisie, partly from the old modes of production it is replacing and partly from parts of the world other than its ‘home’, enables a semi-proletarianized laboring class to produce surplus value for its new rulers.

Second, the means by which a ‘free’ proletariat is created tears people from their ties to pre-capitalist tenure, work relations and mode of management and authority. In return for their labor the members of the new working class are paid monetary wages. Some of the commodities made for capitalists thus assist its reproduction through consumption. For example, increasing proportions of food and shelter, previously produced solely within a non-capitalist mode and for subsistence or barter, are now alienated from this partially transformed class and have to be purchased from the capitalists who ‘stole’ them.

The third component of this process allocates members of society the ‘right’ to buy their independent means of subsistence. The ‘collective’ rights to land in previous modes of production, largely taken by force by the emerging bourgeoisie, are transformed into ‘private’ rights ‘freely’ transformed by monetary exchange. This opportunity only benefits a very small minority of the displaced people. In fact, ideologies accompanying primitive accumulation deceptively celebrate small yeoman-type farmers replacing feudal landowners as a gain in individual liberties, including the right to enter and exit employment.\(^2\) With the commodification of labor and land comes ‘freedom’ for their
(labor and land) purchase and sale, which is celebrated by those bemoaning the coercion inherent in these social relations within previous systems of production. But the vast majority of people (including the customary and intellectual elites), who are dispossessed not only from land but also from the social surplus extracted in the region, are prone to remember them fondly (i.e. the communal rights and privileges of the ties to the land and the guarantees of work therein).

Yet now there are tensions within the dominant development discourses about the role of the state in primitive accumulation processes. For over a quarter of a century, neoliberalism has delegitimized African states as agents of primitive accumulation, deriding them as repositories of ‘rent-seekers’ – protective cabals for ruling classes capable only of conspicuous consumption. The ‘primitive’ forms of accumulation demonstrated by Third World elites, including corruption, are frequently not productive because wealth gained in these processes is not attachable to ‘free’ labor, or available means of production.21 However, by now, the promise of the immediate post-Cold War era has not materialized and the problems of this inherently conflict-ridden process have become increasingly evident. Local or global, the contemporary developmental ‘state’ or ‘region’ must simultaneously promote the bloody process and ameliorate its many devastating consequences. The Nande case and its transnational dynamism seem to display the emergence of an increasingly transnationalized region pursuing capitalist development. But the question of primitive accumulation cannot be avoided.

In fact, Nande traders do not destroy the old modes of production and create a private property regime in their place. They just trade on the surface of these old modes. They transform them to some extent, but not fully. The process thus remains protracted. This extended process of primitive accumulation is indeed disruptive in many respects – the destruction of old modes of production and the emergence of new ones are by definition disruptive. And in the Congo this process is complicated further by taking place amidst a civil war.

This study shows that the peripheral processes of primitive accumulation are not merely destructive but also creative. Class forces within these mixtures of social relations produce new collective organizations, augmenting beneficial processes, resisting harmful ones, and reinventing ‘traditional’ ones. The creation of new Nande capitalist classes (MacGaffey, 1987) is, however, not followed by a transformation of relations of production. The dominant class and the existing elites, including the Catholic Church, are clearly the main agents and beneficiaries of primitive accumulation processes. Neoliberal globalization may be quickening this process, but it is also exaggerating its unevenness (Harvey, 2000).

These processes of primitive accumulation leading to capitalist development co-exist with other modes of production around the world. Nande traders evolve in a global neoliberal environment. In other words, in today’s primitive accumulation, the ruling class is ‘globalized’ (Sklair, 1995), and they work with (and sometimes against) local warlords or bourgeoisie. This class, in the case of the Nande people, is made up of people who, despite the war, strive to maintain self-sustaining and prosperous transnational enterprises, as well as individuals who capture the surplus produced not only in Butembo but also in the surrounding war zones. Indeed, the Nande, other local producers, and traders are only one connection along the global nexus that finally links this devastating violence to apparently far-removed and ostensibly ‘clean’ transnational
capitalist enterprises, which themselves are inevitably another product of the colonial legacy.

In a global order where war disrupts capital accumulation-as-usual, even a weak state must be supported to maintain a semblance of order. A pragmatic neoliberalism is being imposed on the peoples of the DRC (as in Iraq) in order to secure the survival of existing, large postcolonial national states in the region against the prospect of disintegration and dissolution. In this context, the Nande present themselves as paragons of peaceful development while also reinforcing and abetting the conflict they would seem to deplore. Local war is bad for local and global business except to the extent that it can be profitably managed. Thus, this study also has implications for the Great Lakes regional political economy encompassing DRC's eastern neighbors – Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda – and for the study of international political economy more generally. The war is indeed profitably managed for the Nande who are insulated from the surrounding violence.

CONCLUSION

I have tried to show in this article that analyses of postcolonial African states are indeed drawing on a real crisis prevalent in state structures in Africa today. For some scholars, African states are criminalized and for others they merely translate the continuity of the savage nature of Africans. However, these analyses tend to confl ate the absence of government with an utter absence of governance altogether. They generally ignore what comes beyond the apparent collapse of government, including the production of political order outside the top-down framework of the postcolonial state. After reviewing the dominant ways Africa and the DRC are represented by social scientists and the media, this article has shown how these images are the products of a very specific conception of the state, of sovereignty, and of the ('formal') economy. The study has argued that the state is an always historically contingent form of social relations that has been objectified in certain tentatively fixed and territorially limited forms. Images of African states have most of the time reified (or fetishized) these fixed forms through which the state has been objectified.

This article has also challenged the notion that sovereignty is inherently attached to the state. Sovereignty is understood, along with De Genova (2010), as that which is inalienable in the human species; it translates the anthropological reality of power as potentia. I have also begun to show that the historically specific social formation that Nande traders have produced and organized through ‘informal’ economic activities in the eastern Congo reconfigures ‘Nande’-ness as an ensemble of social relations in which human productive powers and creative capacities are paramount. This analysis contradicts some perspectives on African postcolonial states that never go beyond the classic Weberian definition of the state, and in its absence, can only reassert the nightmares of Conrad.

Caricatures of the Congo stem not only from a theoretical incapacity of some Western scholars to depart from epistemological prejudices and deconstruct the Weberian state, but also from the particular history of the Congo state. There are particular moments in the history of the Congo which indeed give rise to such depictions. However, part of the same history of the Congo dismisses the caricature of the ‘heart of darkness’. The Nande have resisted these dark images since the precolonial period up to and including their present incarnation as a dynamic and creative transnational ethnic social formation.
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Notes
1. Elsewhere, like Roitman (2005), they argue that the state is redeployed in the contemporary area and not absent at all. The pervasive presence of the state is also manifested by what Janet Roitman (2005) calls ‘pluralisation of regulatory authority’. As she puts it: ‘what we observe are transformations in representations of certain aspects of state power, which partly explain why regulatory authority has become a plural, or heterogeneous field’ (2005: 200).

2. The concept of the shadow state as used by Reno refers to the parallel political authority in the informal market of the near total decay of formal state institutions (Reno, 1995: 1).

3. For an interesting discussion of Kaplan’s ideology, see Neil Larsen (1997). I will closely follow Larsen’s comments. When it was published in February 1994 in the Atlantic Monthly, Bill Clinton required that ‘The Coming of Anarchy’, a section of The Ends of the Earth, be faxed to all US embassies and consulates in the world (Moore, 2001).

4. One might say that Kaplan’s book is outdated and may not resonate with current thinking on the transformation of African states postcolonization. One could also suggest that even if these ideas might still exist in the minds of the average European or American, scholars have moved forward since then. I think that there is still persistence of culturally-constituted ideas of government which are uncritically paraded as the true, the obvious and the natural. I remember the concluding remarks made by one of the prominent American academics at the end of a conference I organized in Bujumbura with African scholars in June 2009. I quote: ‘I am surprised by the level of organization, the level of discipline, it matches all standards, including European and American’. The sub-text of this speech is that ‘I am surprised that you are so organized, so disciplined’.

5. Failed state is defined by the non-performance of key state functions (Zartman, 1995). I will come back later to this concept.


7. Coltan is the generic name of ‘Columbite-Tantalite’, a black mineral found in Brazil, Australia, and Canada, with the majority of the world’s remaining reserves in the DRC. It occurs in ancient rock formations known as granitic pegmatites, where eroded rock has been deposited by water. The pegmatites crystallize slowly and retain a great deal of water and are often enriched with rare elements and gemstones such
as topaz and tournalines. Riverbeds and alluvial deposits are the main source in the Congo. Coltan found in these formations is largely composed of two rare elements: niobium and tantalum. Even though it is difficult to purify – hence its name – the pure metal was ‘tantalizing’ to the eyes but always out of reach (once purified, tantalum is a hard gray metal that can easily be drawn into wire or deformed without breaking). Through the world £4 million of tantalum is consumed each year in the form of metal powder, wire, fabricated forms, as well as compounds and alloys used in cellphone, computer, and video game components. Coltan miners earn $450 per week when the average Congolese worker can expect $10 per month. In the DRC, a team of miners can extract a kilo of coltan per day. In 1998 the price of coltan was $40 per kilo, but then it spiked up to $400 in 2000 and has hovered around $100 ever since, with demand only increasing. According to Jason Perkinson, an IndyMediaUK journalist, 80 percent of Congo coltan arrives at the Sons of Gwalia in Australia for processing. Then the tantalum is sold primarily to Germany’s Bayer subsidiary, H.C. Stark, and the American company Cabot, which in turn make capacitors for customers such as Alcatel, Compaq, Dell, IBM, Ericson, Nokia and Siemens. The price peaked in 2000 because Sony launched Playstation 2 and a new generation of mobile phones. The British MP Oona King writes: ‘Kids in Congo are being sent down into mines to die so that kids in Europe and America can kill imaginary aliens in their living rooms’ (cf. Bush and Seeds, 2008).

8. North Kivu region is composed of five territories: Beni, Lubero, Masisi, Rutshuru and Walikale. Nande people are located in Beni-Lubero region which is also called the ‘Grand North’, with almost 5 million people representing a third of the population of the entire region.

9. See Kabamba (forthcoming 2010). This book describes the frameworks Nande people have used over time to work the economy in their favor despite a series of obstacles.


11. Much of this discussion is borrowed from Nelson (1992).

12. On the accusation of cannibalism by the Bishop of Butembo, see Pottier (2007).

13. From a Hegelian perspective, Kantian categories are hard, rigid, and absolutely separated from one another (Kant, 1996[1781–7]: 132).

14. This appearance of rigidity, stability, and fixity is what Marx would characterize as fetishization, or in De Genova’s gloss, reification.

15. Berger (2000) talked about the first African world war because more than six different national armies participated in this conflict inside the Congo. The only comparable antecedent was the Angolan war of independence beginning in 1975, which involved the armies of Cuba and apartheid South Africa in the conflict.


17. MacGaffey refers to the ‘real economy’ to signify that this is in fact what people live on. For Johnson and Weinstein (2004), it is the ‘real market’ to be introduced to the theory of international exchange. In contrast, working on the Chad basin, Roitman (2001) sees these activities as an extension of state regulatory mechanisms.

18. ‘Ce commerce parallele n’était rien d’autre que le nouveau circuit d’échange mis au point par les anciennes communautés . . . marchandes de l’époque caravaniere dont
les activités avaient été paralysées par les lois de l’économie coloniale [This parallel trade was the new exchange channels put in place by ancient merchant communities during the time of caravans. These activities were paralyzed by the colonial economy]’ (Igue, 1983: 38). The translation is mine.

19. Here I am using Moore’s discussion (see Moore, 2004).

20. Marx’s primitive accumulation account allows ‘free peasant proprietors’ to exist under many forms of feudal title. But these forms will eventually disappear under the pressure of agrarian capitalists (Marx, Capital, vol. 2).

21. For Marx, ‘what enables money wealth to become capital is the encounter, on one side, with free workers; on the other side, with the necessaries and materials, etc, which previously were in one way or another the property of masses who have now become object-less, and are free and purchasable’ (Marx, 1978[1843]: 269).

References


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